Suppose there is a monopolist manufacturer in the wholesale market with a marginal cost at 30, MCM-30, and no fixed cost. There is also a monopolist retailer in the retail market with the retail demand equation: p=110- q. The manufacturer first chooses the wholesale price w, and after observing w the retailer chooses the retail price p. And they work separately from each other. A. Find the Nash equilibrium. B. Find each firm's profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare at equilibrium. C. If the manufacturer and the retailer are integrated, find the new total profit and the consumer surplus. D. Suppose the manufacturer and the retailer are still separate from each other. But they can sign a franchise contract so that (1) their total profit can be increased to the level of integration case; and (2) the manufacturer's profit will triple the retailer's profit, лM-3лR. How to design this franchise contract? E. Suppose another retailer enters the retail market and engages in the Bertrand competition with the original retailer. The monopolist manufacturer charges these two retailers the same wholesale price w, and then the retailers choose their respective retail prices p₁, p2, in the retail market. The manufacturer's cost and the retail demand remain the same as in part A. Find the new Nash equilibrium.