Answer:
The Cuban Missile Crisis stands as a seminal event.2
History offers no parallel to those thirteen
days of October 1962, when the USA and the Soviet Union paused at the nuclear precipice.
Never before had there been such a high probability that so many lives would end suddenly.
Had war come, it could have meant the death of 100 million Americans and more than
100 million Russians, and millions of Europeans as well. Other catastrophes and inhumanities
of history would have faded into insignifi cance. Given the odds of disaster—which President
Kennedy estimated as ‘between one out of three and even’—our escape is staggering (Steel
1969: 22).
In retrospect, this crisis proved a major watershed in the Cold War. For thirteen days, the
USA and the Soviet Union stood ‘eyeball to eyeball’, each with the power of mutualdestruction in hand. Having peered over the edge of the nuclear precipice, both nations
edged backwards towards détente. Never again was the risk of war between them as great as
it was during the last two weeks of October 1962. Thus an understanding of this crisis is es-
sential for every serious student of foreign affairs.Operation Anadyr
American sources and newly available material from the Soviet Union now permit us to re-
construct the Soviet arms build-up that culminated in the conversion of Cuba into a major
strategic missile base.3
The Soviet government first gave arms to Cuba in the autumn of 1959. The Soviets and
Cubans negotiated the next phase of military assistance in early 1962. The Soviet Presid-
ium approved Cuban requests for additional weapons in April 1962, and the Soviets re-
sumed arms shipments at a markedly increased pace in late July. By 1 September, Soviet
arms in Cuba included surface-to-air missiles, coastal defence Sopka cruise missiles, patrol
boats armed with anti-ship missiles, and more than 5000 Soviet technicians and military
personnel.
l
.
